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 Abstract 
We analyze the abnormal returns to target shareholders in cross-border and domestic 
acquisitions of UK companies.  The cross-border effect during the bid month is small (0.84 
percentage points), although cross-border targets gain significantly more than domestic 
targets during the months surrounding the bid.  We find no evidence for the level of 
abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions to be associated with market access or 
exchange rate effects, and only limited support for an international diversification effect.  
However, the cross-border effect appears to be associated with significant payment effects, 
and there is no significant residual cross-border effect once various bid characteristics are 
controlled for.  
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 Executive Summary 
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During the late 1980s and early 1990s, cross-border acquisitions into the UK rose to 
record levels.  In this paper we explore various hypotheses as to why we might expect the 
levels of target company abnormal returns to differ systematically between domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions, and test these hypotheses on a sample of 514 domestic and 116 
cross-border acquisitions into the UK over the 1986-1991 period.  
During the month of the bid announcement, UK targets gain significantly in both 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions, with abnormal returns (using the size deciles 
model) of 18.76% and 19.60% in domestic and cross-border acquisitions, respectively.  The 
additional gain to targets in cross-border acquisitions – the cross-border effect – is small 
(0.84 percentage points), and is not statistically significant.  However, during the months 
prior to and following the bid, target abnormal returns are significantly higher in bids by 
foreign acquirors, and significant cross-border effects are observed if longer time periods 
around the bid announcement are analyzed.  Indeed, over the four-month period from t-2 to 
t+1 (where t refers to the month of the bid announcement), shareholders in UK companies 
acquired by overseas companies on average gain 10.07 percentage points more than do 
targets in domestic UK acquisitions, at 30.71% compared to 20.64%. 
We test three hypotheses as to why a target company cross-border effect may be 
present: the international diversification hypothesis, the market access hypothesis, and the 
exchange rate hypothesis.  The international diversification hypothesis is tested by 
analyzing the extent to which abnormal returns vary with the location of the overseas 
bidder.  We find some variations in the level of abnormal returns in cross-border 
acquisitions depending on where the bidding company is based, with targets gaining 
somewhat more from acquisitions by bidders located outside Europe or the US than in 
other cross-border acquisitions.  However, this result is only significant for one of three 
event windows, and is not robust.  There is thus only limited support for the international 
diversification hypothesis. 
It has been argued that market access is a key motive for foreign direct investment 
(Pringle (1991)).  It can therefore be hypothesized that bidders without operations in either 
the UK or in other EU member states prior to the acquisition will be prepared to pay higher 
premia than other cross-border bidders.  However, we find that whether or not the bidder 
had prior UK operations does not have a significant impact on the level of abnormal returns 
to UK targets. There is thus no support for the UK market access hypothesis.  We further 
find UK targets to gain somewhat more where the overseas bidder already had operations 
within the EU, contrary to the predictions of the EU market access hypothesis, which we 
therefore reject.  There is thus no evidence of the level of target company returns in cross-
border acquisitions being positively related to acquiring companies seeking either UK or 
EU market access. 
The last hypothesis to be tested relates to the impact of exchange rates.  Froot and 
Stein (1991) suggest that target shareholders may gain more when the currency of the target 
country is relatively weak compared to the currency of the acquiring company’s home 
country.  Our data suggests, however, that UK targets gained insignificantly more, rather 
than less, when Sterling was relatively strong.  This is contrary to the predictions of the 
exchange rate effect hypothesis, which we therefore reject. 
The level of abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions – and hence the target 
company cross-border effect – thus appears not to be due to market access or exchange rate 
 2 
 
effects, and we find only weak support for the international diversification hypothesis. 
The target company cross-border effect appears to be attributable largely to 
differences in the characteristics of domestic and cross-border acquisitions, and the impact 
of such characteristics on the level of target abnormal returns. Indeed, the level of abnormal 
returns is found to depend significantly on the bid characteristics, in particular the method 
of payment.  Target shareholders gain significantly less in equity offers, and somewhat 
more in cash offers, in particular those with a loan note alternative (which have tax 
advantages compared to pure cash offers).  As a significantly higher (lower) proportion of 
domestic than cross-border acquisitions are equity (cash, both with and without loan note 
alternatives) offers, this appears to account for most of the target company cross-border 
effect. 
Other bid characteristics, including bid outcome and whether or not the bid was 
competitive, are also found to have a significant impact on the cross-sectional variation in 
the level of abnormal returns.  Once bid characteristics are controlled for, the bid month 
cross-border effect reverses sign to -2.56 percentage points with the size deciles model, 
while for the longer event period from t-2 to t+1 months, the cross-border effect is reduced 
to an insignificant +3.26 percentage points.  The cross-border effect thus appears to be 
largely attributable to differences in the bid characteristics of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions.  There is no evidence of a residual target company cross-border effect being 
present in the UK once the method of payment and other bid characteristics are controlled 
for. 
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 Target Company Cross-Border Effects in Acquisitions 
into the UK 
 
1.  Introduction 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, acquisitions of UK companies – and in 
particular the level of cross-border acquisitions into the UK – rose to new heights 
(Acquisitions Monthly).  If capital markets and the market for corporate control are not 
segmented internationally, one would not expect the level of abnormal returns to target 
company shareholders to be systematically different in domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions (Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991)).  However, Kang 
(1993) argue that 
“since the theory of FDI posits that imperfections ... give multinational firms a 
competitive advantage over local firms in the host country, cross-border 
acquisitions are likely to create more wealth than domestic acquisitions.  Since 
targets tend to reap more of the benefits of the acquisitions, the theory suggests the 
wealth gains to targets of ... [foreign] firms are larger than those to targets ... [in 
domestic acquisitions]”. (p. 348). 
In this paper we explore various hypotheses as to why we might expect target 
company abnormal returns to differ systematically between domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions, and test these hypotheses on UK data for the 1986-1991 period based on a 
sample of 514 domestic and 116 cross-border acquisitions into the UK.  We find that 
during the month of the bid announcement, UK target shareholders gain significantly in 
both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, and the target company cross-border effect of 
0.84 percentage points (with the size deciles model) is not statistically significant.  
However, during the months prior to and following the bid month, target abnormal returns 
are significantly higher for cross-border acquisitions.  Target company abnormal returns in 
cross-border acquisitions appear to be unrelated to market access or exchange rate effects, 
and there is only limited support for the international diversification hypothesis.  However, 
there is evidence to suggest that the target company cross-border effect may be related to 
differences in the characteristics of domestic and cross-border acquisitions.  In particular, 
target shareholders are found to gain less from equity exchange offers (which are common 
in domestic acquisitions) and more from cash offers with full loan note alternatives (which 
are common in cross-border acquisitions) than from acquisitions with other forms of 
payment.  Once we control for the method of payment and other bid characteristics, there is 
no evidence of a residual target company cross-border effect in acquisitions in the UK. 
The paper is organized as follows: The factors identified in the literature as to why 
target shareholders may be expected to gain more in cross-border than in domestic 
acquisitions are discussed in section 2.  This is followed by a brief discussion of prior 
empirical evidence on the target company cross-border effect in section 3.  In section 4 the 
data and methodology are explained, and section 5 presents the empirical results, which 
includes tests of a number of hypotheses derived from the theoretical and empirical 
literatures also discussed in this section.  Conclusions are provided in the final section of 
the paper. 
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2. Target Company Cross-Border Effects – Theoretical Considerations 
Factors suggested in the literature to explain why target shareholders may gain more 
in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions fall into four main categories: international 
risk diversification; market access; exchange rate effects; and managerial factors1. 
 
2.1. International Risk Diversification 
While shareholders have been found to benefit from international portfolio 
diversification (e.g., Solnik (1974) and Davis (1991)), there is less agreement as to whether 
such benefits extend to corporate diversification (Sudia (1992), Markides and Ittner (1994), 
Hymer (1976), Jacquillat and Solnik (1978), Fatemi (1984), and Michel and Shaked 
(1986)).  However, Hymer (1976), Hisey and Caves (1985) and Markides and Ittner (1994) 
argue that, under certain market inefficiencies, investors could benefit from international 
corporate diversification through cross-border acquisitions.  For example, information 
asymmetries may mean that a company is better informed than its investors, and thus able 
to make better investment decisions than its shareholders.  Markides and Ittner add that 
“...the multinational corporation is performing a valuable service to investors in that it 
allows them to diversify their portfolios indirectly”. (p. 346).  Thus, it can be hypothesized 
that corporate international diversification has the potential of being beneficial to 
shareholders.  If international diversification is an additional source of value to overseas 
bidders (and they are prepared to or are forced by target shareholders to pass on part of that 
benefit to them), one would expect target shareholders to gain more in cross-border than in 
domestic acquisitions.  
We test various aspects of the international diversification hypothesis in the cross-
sectional analysis.  In addition to analyzing the differences in abnormal returns to targets in 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions, we also analyze whether the abnormal returns in 
cross-border acquisitions vary with the location of the overseas bidder.  It can be 
hypothesized that diversification benefits will be larger in acquisitions by companies based 
outside Europe, than from intra-European acquisitions.  However, as argued by Bodnar et 
al. (1997), the positive effect of international diversification may be offset by negative 
effects associated with industrial diversification.  Consequently, we control for industry 
effects, and for whether the acquisition is horizontal, vertical or conglomerate, to ensure 
that we separate any industrial diversification effects from the potential international 
diversification effect. 
 
2.2. Market Access 
“FDI into industrial countries has always been dominated by ... [one] motive, i.e. 
market access.” (Pringle (1991), p. 9).  International takeovers may thus be motivated by a 
need to operate locally in order to avoid trade barriers.  This appears to have been an 
important issue in the cross-border takeover activity in Europe following the passing of the 
Single European Act in 1985, with non-EU companies actively acquiring companies within 
the community before the introduction of the Single European Market in 1992 (Geroski and 
Vlassopoulos (1990) and Vasconcellos and Kish (1998)). 
If market access is valuable to foreign bidders, it may be anticipated that bidding 
companies without a foothold in the UK, or in any other EU member country, will be 
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willing to pay higher takeover premia than bidders previously operating in these markets.  
In the cross-sectional analysis we test the market access hypothesis by analysing whether 
the level of abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions is influenced by whether or not 
the acquiring company had UK or EU operations prior to the bid announcement.  
 
2.3. Exchange Rate Effects 
 Swenson (1993) and Vasconcellos and Kish (1998) note that the level of cross-
border acquisitions into the US was higher at “...times when the U.S. dollar was relatively 
weak” (Swenson, p. 258).  Froot and Stein (1991) argue that, due to information 
asymmetries, external financing is costly.  Thus, the higher the wealth of the entrepreneur, 
the lower her cost of capital.  If “...foreigners hold more of their wealth in nondollar-
denominated form, a depreciation of the dollar increases the relative wealth position of 
foreigners and hence lowers their relative cost of capital.  This allows them to bid more 
aggressively for assets”. (p. 1194).   Exchange rate fluctuations might also have an impact 
on the level of abnormal returns to target shareholders in cross-border acquisitions.  
Servaes and Zenner (1990), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Swenson (1993) and Kang 
(1993) all find US target shareholders to gain more in cross-border acquisitions when the 
currency of the predator’s home country is strong relative to the target company’s currency. 
Not all studies find support for the exchange rate effect.  For example, Cebenoyan 
et al. (1992), Feils (1993), and Dewenter (1995) do not find the strength of the currency to 
have a significant impact on the level of abnormal returns.  Morgan and Morgan (1990) 
argue that “when a currency fluctuates ... there are bound to be times at which it is under-
valued, and these will provide bargain-hunting opportunities for overseas companies”. (p. 
66).  However, Cakici et al. (1991) argue that “while a devalued dollar might enable the 
foreign buyer to acquire an American firm at a discount, the dollar cash flows subsequent 
to the merger are correspondingly less valuable when converted back into the foreign 
currency at the current exchange rate.  Thus, a low foreign exchange value of the dollar 
does not justify high prices for American target firms”. (p. 45).  Similar arguments are put 
forward by Vasconcellos and Kish (1998).  The theoretical issue of whether exchange rates 
have an impact on the level of abnormal returns to target shareholders thus remains 
controversial, and the empirical evidence is mixed.  The impact of the exchange rate effect 
on the level of abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions into the UK is tested in the 
cross-sectional analysis. 
 
2.4. Managerial Factors 
As with domestic acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions may not only be driven by 
shareholder wealth maximization objectives, but may also be a result of agency conflict, 
with bidding company management aiming to maximize their own utility.  Through 
acquisitions, management may increase their power, status, and salary.  In an analysis of 
domestic UK acquisitions, Firth (1991) find acquiring company management to gain from 
mergers and acquisitions regardless of whether their shareholders gain or lose as a result of 
the transactions.  Bliss and Rosen (2001) obtain similar findings for bank mergers in the 
US.  If managers are pursuing power and status through empire building, cross-border 
acquisitions may be more advantageous to managers than domestic transactions. 
In his hubris hypothesis, Roll (1986) argues that bidding companies tend to 
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overestimate the value of economic benefits of the merger.  The target company bid 
premium may thus be the result of valuation error.  If overseas companies are more difficult 
to value than domestic firms due to e.g., different accounting standards and valuation 
conventions, as well as the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on company value (Solnik 
(1996) and Shapiro (1999)), the size of any valuation error (and thus, the degree of any 
overpayment) may be larger in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions. 
In an analysis of cross-border acquisitions into the UK, Danbolt (1995) finds 
overseas bidding companies to suffer negative abnormal returns, indicating that overseas 
bidders pay too high a price for their UK targets.  Indeed, the post-bid performance of cross-
border bidders appears to be significantly worse than the performance of domestic UK 
bidders (Danbolt (1996)).  This suggests that any target company cross-border effect may be 
due to managerial overconfidence or managers of cross-border bidders pursuing the 
maximization of personal utility, rather than the maximization of shareholder wealth, to a 
greater extent than do domestic bidders. 
To explicitly test for managerial factors akin to the studies of e.g., Firth (1991) and 
Bliss and Rozen (2001) would require detailed data on remuneration and share holdings of 
the managers of the overseas acquiring companies.  Such data is not available for the 
current research project.  Rather, we treat managerial factors as a residual category.  If a 
target company cross-border effect is found to be present – after controlling for 
international risk diversification, market access and exchange rate effects (as well as for 
various bid characteristics, discussed further in section 5.4 below) – this may indicate that 
the cross-border acquisitions are driven by managerial factors rather than the pursuit of the 
maximization of shareholder wealth. 
 
3. Target Company Cross-Border Effects  – Prior Empirical Evidence 
The literature on domestic mergers and acquisitions in the UK (e.g., Franks and 
Harris (1989) and Limmack (1991)) as well as in other markets (such as e.g., Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) and Franks et al. (1991) for the US) invariably indicate that large abnormal 
returns accrue to target company shareholders.  Although one would expect target 
shareholders to gain significantly also in cross-border acquisitions, the level of such gains 
may, as explained in the previous section, be systematically different from those associated 
with domestic acquisitions. 
For the US market, positive target company cross-border effects are found by e.g., 
Tessema (1985), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Shaked et al. (1991), Cebenoyan et al. 
(1992), Kang (1993), Marr et al. (1993), Swenson (1993), and Cheng and Chan (1995), 
although Dewenter (1995) do not find the abnormal returns to US target shareholders to be 
systematically different in domestic and cross-border acquisitions once industry-effects are 
controlled for. Similarly, Wansley et al. (1983) find the cross-border effect to disappear, 
once the analysis is restricted to cash financed conglomerate acquisitions. 
Conn and Connell (1990) and Feils (1993), analyzing the abnormal returns in cross-
border mergers between US and UK companies, find the gains to UK targets to be only 
about half as large as those observed for US targets.  However, neither Conn and Connell 
nor Feils analyze UK target companies in domestic acquisitions, and are thus unable to 
comment upon the nature of any target company cross-border effect in the UK. 
Prior studies tend to find US target shareholders to gain more in cross-border than 
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in domestic acquisitions.  However, there is at least some evidence to suggest that the target 
company cross-border effect may be attributable to differences in the characteristics of 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions, rather than to fundamental differences in the level 
of abnormal returns associated with domestic and overseas acquirors per se (Wansley et al. 
(1983) and Dewenter (1995)).  In addition, the low level of abnormal returns to target 
shareholders in cross-border acquisitions into the UK (as reported by Conn and Connell 
(1990) and Feils (1993)), may suggest that the presence of a similar target cross-border 
effect in the UK is unlikely.  In this paper we explicitly test whether the level of abnormal 
returns to shareholders in listed UK companies targeted in cross-border and domestic 
acquisitions are systematically different.  In addition, we test whether target company 
abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions is associated with international risk 
diversification, market access or exchange rate effects, or whether any cross-border effect 
is associated with differences in the characteristics of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. 
 
4. Data Sources and Methodology 
 This paper contains an analysis of 116 cross-border and 514 domestic takeover bids 
for listed UK companies made on or after 1 January 1986 and for which the bid outcome 
was known prior to the end of December 19912.  Information as to what takeover bids took 
place, the name of the bidding and target companies, the nationality of the bidder, the bid 
outcome, whether or not the bid was competitive or revised, the form of payment offered, 
the percentage stake by the bidding company in the target at the time of the bid 
announcement (the toehold), the industry of the target company, and whether the 
acquisition was horizontal, vertical or conglomerate, was obtained from Acquisitions 
Monthly, while exchange rate data was obtained from Datastream.  Acquisitions Monthly, 
as well as Financial Times news stories around the time of the bid announcement, were 
searched in order to ascertain whether the initial offer by the bidder received a hostile 
reception from the target company board of directors.  A wide variety of sources were 
searched (including company accounts, Datastream, Global Access, Extel, Financial Times, 
Sequencer, as well as letters to several companies) for data on whether the overseas 
acquiring companies had either UK or EU operations prior to the time of the acquisition.  
Market capitalizations of equity were obtained from the London Business School Risk 
Measurement Service (edited by Dimson and Marsh)3, while monthly log returns were 
obtained from the London Business School Share Price Database. 
For the majority of the bidding companies, the classification of nationality used by 
Acquisitions Monthly (which classifies the bidding companies according to where they, or 
their mother companies if the bidding company is a subsidiary, have their registered office) 
is adopted in this paper.  However, where the bidding company is not listed in its home 
market but listed elsewhere, the nationality of the bidder is reclassified to the country of the 
main stock market listing of the company4.   
While the market model is the most widely used event study model, prior research 
by Connell and Conn (1993) and Gregory (1997) suggests the assumptions of stationary α 
and β values are questionable.  Due to the difficulties in establishing the appropriate 
benchmark, these and other researchers advocate the application of several test models in 
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the analysis of mergers and acquisitions, as the choice of model may influence the results 
obtained.  In addition, studies such as Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Gregory (1997) and 
Higson and Elliott (1998) suggest that controlling for the commonly observed size effect in 
the return generating process may be of particular importance in studies of mergers and 
acquisitions, as target companies tend to be small. 
In this study, two such size-adjusted benchmarks are applied in addition to three 
more conventional models.  The size-deciles (SD) control model compares the return on the 
share to a benchmark derived from a portfolio of companies with similar market 
capitalization to the company in question.  The size deciles are constructed using monthly 
log return data for all UK companies available from Datastream during each month, with 
annual rebalancing of the decile constituents.  Target companies are matched with the 
appropriate size decile returns based on the pre-bid market value of the target.  The Hoare-
Govett small companies model is a variant of the capital asset pricing model including both 
the overall market index and a stock market index for small capitalization companies in the 
benchmark.  The other three test models applied in this study are the index model (IM), the 
market model (MM) and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).   As the five different 
test models are generally found to produce similar levels of abnormal returns, for brevity 
we report only the results for the size deciles and the market model.  Our main focus is on 
the results from the size deciles model, which has a larger sample size than some of the 
traditional models, and the added benefit of controlling for stock market size effects.  
However, given that most previous studies have tended to focus on the market model, for 
completeness we also report the abnormal returns for this model.  The size deciles and 
market models are specified as follows5: 
SD:  Rit = RSDt + µit (1) 
MM:  Rit = αi + βiRmt + µit (2) 
 
where Rit refers to the return on the share (calculated as Loge[(Pit + Dit)/Pit-1], with Pit 
referring to the share price at time period t and D to dividends), RSDt the equally weighted 
return on the deciles portfolio of companies with similar market values to the company 
being analyzed, Rm the return on the Financial Times Actuaries index for the UK market, αi 
and βi are regression coefficients, and µit the error term (the estimated abnormal return 
during the analysis period).  The market model parameters (as well as those for the CAPM 
and HGSC) have been estimated on a minimum of 30 observations during the period from 
t-68 to t-9, where time periods refer to months relative to the month of the bid 
announcement.  Due to the additional data requirements for the market model compared to 
the size deciles model, the market model sample is reduced to 389 domestic and 96 cross-
border transactions. 
This study adopts a fairly long analysis period, stretching from month t-8 to t+5, 
although, as discussed further below, in the cross-sectional analyses we focus on shorter 
windows surrounding the month of the bid announcement.  Previous studies (e.g., Franks et 
al. (1977) and Limmack (1991)) have found that target company share prices tend to rise 
several months prior to bid announcements.  Adopting a long pre-bid analysis period may 
allow us to establish whether the pattern of share price performance leading up to the bid 
differs between domestic and cross-border acquisitions, and to analyze whether the pre-bid 
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performance of target companies differ depending on whether the bidding company is 
based in the UK or abroad. 
The inclusion of the post-bid period allows the capture of later price reactions in the 
context of the UK merger timetable regulations, which may allow the bid process to extend 
over several months.   Post-bid data thus allows for an analysis of the impact of bid revision 
and bid outcome. 
The level of statistical significance of the equally weighted cumulative abnormal 
returns is tested using the cross-sectional t-test (Strong (1992))6.  The differences in 
abnormal returns in cross-border and domestic acquisitions is tested using a two-sample 
difference in mean t-test (Weiss and Hassett (1986)). 
 
5. Analysis of Results 
5.1. Target Company Shareholders in Domestic Acquisitions 
 The average abnormal returns to the listed UK companies targeted in 514 domestic 
acquisitions during the 1986-1991 period, are detailed in the second and third columns of 
Table 1 for the size deciles and market model, respectively.  As can be seen from this table, 
targets in domestic acquisitions substantially under-perform during the pre-bid period, with 
negative abnormal returns in every month from t-8 to t-3.  It is inappropriate to directly 
attribute these large negative abnormal returns during the pre-bid period – amounting to a 
highly significant -9.04% with the size deciles model, or 6.51% with the market model – to 
the forthcoming bid announcements.  A more plausible explanation is that bidding 
companies target companies with at least a short-term history of poor share price 
performance.  Insignificant abnormal returns are observed for month t-2, while during t-1 
and t, significant positive abnormal returns accrue to target shareholders in domestic UK 
acquisitions.  The abnormal return during the month of the bid announcement amounts to a 
highly significant 18.76% with the size deciles model, or 20.29% with the market model.  
Targets tend to encounter small negative abnormal returns during the months following the 
bid announcement, with cumulative abnormal returns during the post-bid period (t+1, t+5) 
amounting to a highly significant -1.85% with the size deciles model.  While negative (-
1.27%), the post-bid abnormal returns are not significant for the market model.  Still, 
whether the analysis is based on short or long event windows, and regardless of which test 
model is applied, target shareholders in domestic UK acquisitions are found to gain 
significantly around the time of the bid announcement. 
======================== 
 Table 1 about here 
 ======================== 
 
5.2. Target Company Shareholders in Cross-Border Acquisitions 
 The average abnormal returns to UK target companies in 116 cross-border 
acquisitions into the UK are given in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 1.  As is the case 
with target companies in domestic acquisitions, cross-border targets also, on average, 
under-perform during the period from t-8 to t-3.  However, in the case of cross-border 
targets, large positive abnormal returns are observed as early as two months prior to the bid 
announcement, although these are not significant with the market model.  The large pre-bid 
abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions highlight the potential limitation of several 
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previous studies such as Tessema (1985), Feils (1993), and Eun et al. (1996), which apply 
short event windows to the analysis of abnormal returns to targets in cross-border 
acquisitions. 
During the month of the bid announcement, the average abnormal return amounts to 
a highly significant 19.60% with the size deciles model, or 21.05% with the market model. 
 Positive abnormal returns are also observed for the month following the bid announcement 
(although not significant with the market model), while negative abnormal returns are 
observed for months t+3 and t+4.  The post-bid abnormal returns are, however, generally 
small.  The cumulative abnormal returns for the overall post-event period (t+1, t+5) are 
marginally positive (negative) for the size deciles (market) model, although not significant 
with either model. 
 
5.3. Target Company Cross-Border Effects 
The differences in the average abnormal returns to shareholders in the 116 cross-
border and 514 domestic acquisitions are given in the final two columns of Table 1.  As 
discussed above, UK target companies in both cross-border and domestic acquisitions 
significantly under-perform over the period from t-8 to t-3.  The differences in abnormal 
returns during these pre-bid months are small and not statistically significant. 
During the month of the bid announcement, there is a small positive cross-border 
effect of 0.84 percentage points with the size deciles model, or 0.76 percentage points with 
the market model, although these differences in abnormal returns between domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions are not statistically significant.  However, UK targets in cross-
border acquisitions gain more than target shareholders in domestic transactions during the 
months leading up to the bid, as well as during the months after the bid announcement.  
While the differences in abnormal returns are significant with the size deciles model, only 
the cross-border effect for month t-1 is significant for the smaller market model sample. 
The appropriate event window for analyzing the effect on shareholder returns of 
mergers and acquisitions is controversial.  Short windows may not capture the full effect of 
the transaction if there is bid leakage or if price sensitive information is released after the 
initial bid announcement (e.g., the announcement of bid outcome, bid revision, or the entry 
of other companies in the bidding contest).  On the other hand, long windows may 
introduce noise.  In this paper, we focus mainly on the bid month, although we also include 
two slightly longer event windows (t to t+1, and t-2 to t+1) in the cross-sectional analysis.  
As can be seen from Table 1, the cumulative abnormal returns are significantly higher in 
cross-border than in domestic acquisitions for the extended event window, although the 
two-month window is only significant with the size deciles model.  Over the four-month 
period from t-2 to t+1, the cumulative cross-border effect is a highly significant 10.07 
percentage points with the size deiles model (6.98 percentage points with the market 
model), with cumulative abnormal returns of 30.71% (31.35%) in cross-border compared to 
20.64% (24.37%) in domestic acquisitions.  In order to test whether the cross-border effect 
persists once differences in the characteristics of domestic and cross-border acquisitions are 
controlled for, we include these longer event-windows in the cross-sectional analysis.  
Given the levels of abnormal returns are overall similar between the size deciles and market 
models, we focus on the size deciles model in the cross-sectional regressions, due to the 
larger sample size available for this model. 
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5.4. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Previous studies have identified a number of acquisition characteristics, which 
influence the level of target company premia.  It is possible that the cross-border effect 
reported above simply reflects the different characteristics of companies targeted by 
domestic and foreign bidders or the nature of the bids (Lessard (1993)).  In addition, 
Dewenter (1995) find “... that the market’s reaction to buyer nationality is closely tied to 
the transaction’s characteristics”. (p. 421). The bid characteristics are discussed below and 
are subsequently included in the return models as control variables.  Summary statistics for 
the cross-sectional variables included in this study are given in Table 27.   
 ======================== 
 Table 2 about here 
 ======================== 
(i) Payment.  In cash-only acquisitions, target shareholders become immediately liable 
for capital gains tax (CGT) on any inflation-adjusted capital gain above the annual 
tax-free threshold, while if the payment is in loan stock, the CGT becomes payable 
when the loan is repaid (or the loan stock disposed of).  In equity bids, no CGT 
would usually be payable at the time of the acquisition, but rather when the new 
shares in the bidding company are disposed of.  Consequently, in order to 
compensate for the tax effect, it can be hypothesized that target shareholders will 
demand a higher takeover premium in cash than in equity offers (Davidson and 
Cheng (1997)).  Indeed, prior studies such as Wansley et al.  (1983), Huang and 
Walkling (1987), Franks et al. (1988), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and 
Sudarsanam et al. (1996) find target shareholders to gain more in acquisitions with 
cash than with equity offers.   
However, as argued by Davidson and Cheng (1997), cash bids also 
“...reduce the asymmetric information problem that would be created in an 
exchange of common stock" (p. 465).  Travlos (1987), Wansley et al. (1987), 
Franks et al. (1988), Servaes (1991) and Agrawal et al. (1992) all find bidding 
shareholders to experience negative abnormal returns following equity financed 
acquisitions8.  If target shareholders receive payment in the form of shares in the 
bidder, these negative returns on bidding company shares may result in low 
abnormal returns to target shareholders. 
A simple dichotomy between cash and equity bids may not suffice, 
however, as investors may react differently to cash offers with and without loan 
note alternatives, due to the differential tax treatments of cash and loan notes.  In 
addition, investors may prefer offers giving them a choice with regard to the form 
of payment.  The payment effect is analyzed based on five categories of cash only, 
cash with full loan note alternative, equity only, equity with full cash alternative, 
and all other hybrid forms of payment grouped together in a residual fifth category. 
A significantly higher proportion of cross-border than domestic acquisitions 
are cash offers.  This may be because target shareholders are reluctant to receive 
payment in shares of overseas companies, at least if these are not listed in the UK.  
If investors respond more favorably to cash than to equity offers, the cross-border 
effect may be attributable to such a payment effect. 
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(ii) Hostile acquisitions.  Studies by Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell et al., (1988), 
Franks and Harris (1989) and Franks and Mayer (1996), find target shareholders to 
gain more in hostile as compared to uncontested acquisitions.  In addition, 
Dewenter (1995) find “Foreign investors pay more than domestic investors in 
hostile transactions...”. (p. 421).  In the cross-sectional analysis, we introduce a 0-1 
dummy variable taking the value 1 where the initial offer by the bidder was rejected 
by the target board.  However, given that there is no significant difference in the 
proportion of domestic and cross-border bids which are hostile, bid hostility is 
unlikely to account for the target company cross-border effect. 
(iii) Competitive bids.  Studies such as Michel and Shaked (1986), Stulz et al. (1990), 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and De et al. (1996) for domestic US acquisitions, 
and Swenson (1993) for cross-border acquisitions, find US targets to gain 
substantially more in competitive than in single bidder takeovers contests.  
Dewenter (1995) finds target shareholders to gain marginally more in competitive 
bids, although not significantly so.  In the UK market, Sudarsanam et al. (1996) 
find, rather surprisingly, target shareholders to gain marginally less where there 
were multiple bids.  However, all extant research points to a competition effect and 
so a 0-1 dummy is introduced into the model, taking the value 1 in competitive 
bids.  There is no significant difference in the proportion of domestic and cross-
border bids which are competitive. 
(iv) Bid revision.  Franks and Harris (1989) find UK target shareholders to gain 
significantly more in revised bids, although Limmack (1991) for UK acquisitions 
and De et al. (1996) for the US find bid revision to have relatively little impact on 
the level of abnormal returns to targets.  Again a 0-1 dummy is introduced into the 
model to control for this potential factor in the target company premium.  However, 
as approximately the same proportion of domestic and cross-border offers are 
revised, bid revision is unlikely to account for any cross-border effect. 
(v) Outcome.  Jensen and Ruback (1983) observe that although the level of abnormal 
returns to target shareholders in failed acquisitions is at least as high as that of 
successful acquisitions at the time of the bid, target shareholders experience 
negative abnormal returns on the announcement of the unsuccessful bid outcome.  
A 0-1 dummy is introduced, taking the value 1 if the bidder failed to gain control.  
While a slightly higher proportion of domestic than cross-border offers fail, the 
difference is not statistically significant. 
(vi) Industry.  In their analysis of cross-border acquisitions into the US, Cakici et al., 
(1991) find the level of abnormal returns to be significantly higher in acquisitions 
within the manufacturing and oil & gas sectors than for other industries.  Contrary 
to the majority of US studies uncovering large target cross-border effects, Dewenter 
(1995) finds no cross-border effects within the US chemical and retail industries.  
Controlling for industry classification may therefore be of importance in the 
analysis of abnormal returns in domestic and cross-border acquisitions.  We classify 
the target companies into four broad industrial groups, as detailed in Table 2.  As is 
evident from this table, there are significant differences in the industry groupings of 
domestic and cross-border takeover targets.  In particular, a higher proportion of 
domestic than cross-border acquisitions are of UK companies operating within the 
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services sectors, while cross-border acquisitions more commonly involve 
information technology & financial firms. 
(vii) Related.  As argued by Datta and Puia (1995), whether the acquisition is horizontal, 
vertical or conglomerate may have an impact on the level of operating synergies, 
and possibly also on the level of abnormal returns associated with the merger.  
While Wansley et al. (1983) find US targets to gain more in cross-border than in 
domestic acquisitions, the cross-border effect is no longer significant when the 
analysis is restricted to cash financed conglomerate acquisitions.  Splitting their 
sample into horizontal, vertical and conglomerate acquisitions, Cakici et al. (1991) 
find US targets in cross-border acquisitions to gain marginally more in 
conglomerate than in other types of acquisitions.  We follow Cakici et al., and 
similarly classify our sample into three groups based on the relatedness between the 
industries of the target and bidding companies.  A significantly lower proportion of 
cross-border than domestic bids is conglomerate, with correspondingly a higher 
proportion of cross-border bids being horizontal. 
(viii) Bid toehold.  The prior evidence with regard to the effect of bidder toehold on 
target returns is rather mixed.  While Sudarsanam et al. (1996) find pre-bid 
toeholds to have a significant negative impact on the level of abnormal returns to 
UK targets, Franks and Harris (1989) find UK targets to gain more when the 
bidding company hold a large stake prior to the bid announcement.  The percentage 
holding in the target by the bidder at the time of the bid announcement is used as 
the control variable.  Pre-bid stakes tend to be significantly higher in cross-border 
than in domestic acquisitions, and we analyze the impact of toeholds in the cross-
sectional regressions below. 
(ix) Size.  As discussed above, the size effect may cause the observed return to be a 
function of the market value of the company.  In acquisitions, it is also possible that 
bidding companies can afford to be comparatively more generous with small 
targets, thus paying a higher premium to small than to larger target companies.  
Indeed, Peterson and Peterson (1991) argue that “...smaller [US] target firms 
receive greater absolute returns...”. (p. 401).  Consequently, in addition to applying 
size-adjusted models, a size variable (the log of the pre-bid market value of the 
target) is included in the cross-sectional analysis in order to analyze whether target 
company abnormal returns are dependent on the size of the company9.  Target 
companies tend to be larger in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions, and we 
control for this in the cross-sectional analysis. 
 
5.4.1. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Abnormal Returns in Cross-Border Acquisitions  
In this section, three hypotheses as to why a target company cross-border effect may 
be present are tested: the international diversification hypothesis, the market access 
hypothesis, and the exchange rate hypothesis.  We test these hypotheses in cross-sectional 
analyses of target returns in cross-border acquisitions.  The results are reported in Table 3.  
Given the potential impact of company characteristics on the level of target abnormal 
returns, we control for various bid characteristics, as discussed in the previous section. 
======================== 
Table 3 about here 
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Location of cross-border bidder and international diversification.  It can be 
hypothesized that the degree of international diversification benefit from cross-border 
acquisitions into the UK will vary with the location of the overseas bidder.  The 
international diversification hypothesis is tested by analyzing whether the level of gains to 
target shareholders in cross-border acquisitions is dependent upon whether the bidding 
company is based within the EU, in other European countries, in the US, or in other 
overseas countries.  If bidders are willing to pay high prices for international 
diversification, we would expect UK targets to gain more in acquisitions by either US or 
‘rest of the world’ bidders than from intra EU or European acquisitions. 
As can be seen from Table 3, target abnormal returns are somewhat larger in 
acquisitions by companies based outside of Europe than in intra-European cross-border 
acquisitions.  In particular, the coefficient for ‘rest of the world’ is positive and significant 
for the t to t+1 event window, although the coefficients are not significant for either the bid 
month itself or for the longer t-2 to t+1 event window.  There is thus only limited support 
for the international risk diversification hypothesis. 
Market access.  The takeover bids analyzed in this study took place during the time 
period between the passing of the Single European Act and the introduction of the Single 
European Market.  A large proportion of the cross-border bids appears to have been 
undertaken in order to gain access to the European Market, and it can be hypothesized that 
the cross-border effect will depend on whether or not the bidder has operations in either the 
UK or in other EU member states prior to the cross-border acquisition.  We test two aspects 
of the market access hypothesis:  Firstly, we test the UK market access hypothesis.  We 
introduce two 0-1 dummy variables, with ‘prior UK operations’ taking the value 1 where 
the overseas acquiring company has operations in the UK prior to the time of the bid 
announcement and zero otherwise, and the ‘no prior UK operations’ dummy taking the 
value 1 where the acquisition represent a new entry into the UK market and zero otherwise. 
 Unfortunately, despite the use of numerous data sources, sufficient information to verify 
whether the overseas acquiring company had prior UK (or EU) operations was not 
available for all transactions.  The unclassified bids are left as a third residual category10. 
Secondly, we test the EU market access hypothesis.  We introduce another two 0-1 
dummy variables capturing the presence of prior EU (including UK) operations prior to the 
bid announcement.  If overseas bidders are willing to pay high premia for market access, 
we would expect the dummy variables for ‘no prior operations’ in the UK or the EU to be 
positive, and possibly the coefficient for ‘prior operations’ to be negative11. 
While the negative (but insignificant) coefficients for prior UK operations may 
appear to lend some support to our market access hypothesis, this is contradicted by the 
coefficients for the ‘no prior UK operations’ dummies, which are also negative (although 
again not statistically significant).  There are no significant differences between the 
coefficients for the presence and absence of prior UK operations.  There is thus no support 
for a UK market access hypothesis. 
While the coefficients for the ‘no prior EU operations’ are positive, as 
hypothesized, none of the coefficients are statistically significant.  However, rather 
surprisingly, we observe larger and – for the bid month statistically significant – positive 
coefficients for the ‘prior EU operations’ dummies.  This suggests that bidders with prior 
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EU operations paid higher prices for their UK targets than did bidders without a EU 
presence, although the coefficients are not significant for the longer event window.  The 
positive coefficient for prior EU operations is contrary to the EU market access hypothesis, 
which we therefore reject.  There is no evidence of the level of target company returns in 
cross-border acquisitions being positively related to acquiring companies seeking either 
UK or EU market access.   
Exchange rate.  As argued in the theoretical framework, it can be hypothesized that 
UK target shareholders will gain more when Sterling is relatively weak against the 
currency of the overseas bidding company, although the prior evidence is rather mixed.  
The exchange rate variable measures the deviation in the exchange rate between Sterling 
and the home currency of the overseas acquiring company during the month of the bid 
announcement from the mean exchange rate during the previous two years.  The mean 
exchange rate variable (as reported in Table 2) of 0.0083 is somewhat puzzling, indicating 
that the cross-border acquisitions generally take place when the currency of the acquiring 
company is marginally weak (relative to previous levels) against Sterling.  As reported in 
Table 3, the coefficient for the exchange rate variable is positive, indicating that UK targets 
gain marginally more when Sterling is relatively strong, contrary to the predictions of the 
exchange rate effect hypothesis.  However, the coefficients are not statistically significant 
for any of the event windows.  
The analysis above indicates that the level of abnormal returns in cross-border 
acquisitions do not appear to be driven by international diversification, market access or 
exchange rate effects. 
The overall explanatory powers of the regressions are low, with the adjusted R2 
ranging between 0.3% and 6.1%, and none of the regressions are overall statistically 
significant. However, a few of the variables are significant, at least for some event 
windows, indicating that the level of abnormal returns may depend on the characteristics of 
the bid.  The industry of the target firm, as well as the industrial relatedness between the 
target and the bidder, appears to have some impact on the level of abnormal returns to 
target shareholders in cross-border acquisitions.  Targets within the IT & financials sectors 
are found to gain somewhat less than other targets, and targets gain somewhat more in 
vertical than in either horizontal or conglomerate acquisitions.  However, the regression 
coefficients are not significant for all event windows and the results are not robust. 
None of the regression coefficients for bid hostility, competitive bids, the size of the 
pre-bid stake or company size are found to be significant.  Although the abnormal returns 
are marginally higher in cash bids (and in particular those with a loan note alternative) than 
in offers with other forms of payment, the coefficients are generally not significant.  The 
evidence of a payment effect being present in cross-border acquisitions is thus weak12. 
 
5.4.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Cross-Border Effect 
In the previous section we established that bid specific variables explain some of 
the cross-sectional variation in the level of target abnormal returns.  In order to test whether 
these bid characteristics account for the target company cross-border effect, we repeat the 
cross-sectional analysis for the whole sample of cross-border and domestic acquisitions, 
with a cross-border dummy (taking the value 1 in cross-border acquisitions) added to the 
explanatory variables.  These results are reported in Table 4. 
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 ======================== 
 Table 4 about here 
 ======================== 
All of the regressions are overall significant, although the explanatory power of the 
regressions – particularly for the two short event windows – are low, with adjusted R2 of 
2.2% and 3.5% the t and t to t+1 event windows, respectively.  The explanatory power for 
the longer event window of t-2 to t+1 is better, as reflected by the adjusted R2 of 8.8%.  
Overall, shareholders in the UK, particularly over the longer event window, tend to gain 
more from cash bids with full loan note alternatives or from competitive bids, than they do 
from other offers.  Conversely, the levels of target abnormal returns are significantly lower 
in equity-only offers or failed acquisitions than they are after other bids.  This is consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Franks et al. (1988) and Harris and Ravenscraft (1991)).  While 
positive coefficients (significant for the long event window) are observed for cash offers 
with loan note alternatives, insignificant coefficients are observed for cash-only bids.  The 
results may relate to the different tax implications of such offers, with shareholders 
preferring loan notes to cash, due to their more favorable tax treatment (Sudarsanam 
(1995)). 
The analysis of bid hostility, competitiveness, revision and outcome is complicated 
by the fact that these variables are all significantly positively correlated13.  While the 
regressions reported in Table 4 include all four variables, regressions with all possible 
combinations of the four variables included/excluded were undertaken for robustness 
checks.  The results vary somewhat depending on the event window used as well as on the 
combination of explanatory variables included in the analysis, indicating some problems of 
colinearity between these variables.  Consistent with our expectations, we find UK targets 
to gain more – particularly over the longer event windows – in competitive than in single 
bidder contests, and less in failed than in successful acquisitions.  Bid hostility and bid 
revision – while significant if tested independently – are found not to have a significant 
impact on the levels of target company abnormal returns once the presence of multiple 
bidders and bid outcome are also controlled for. 
Neither the size of the pre-bid stake, nor the size of the target firm, appears to have 
a significant impact on the levels of abnormal returns to UK targets.  Similarly, none of the 
industry or industry relatedness variables are statistically significant. 
  While some of the cross-sectional variables are significant, none of the ‘cross-
border’ dummy variables are significant.  There is thus no evidence of a residual cross-
border effect being present in the UK once pay and other company and bid characteristics 
are controlled for.  Indeed, once we control for such characteristics, the target company 
cross-border effect during the month of the bid announcement (or over the two-month 
period from t to t+1) reverse sign, from an insignificant +0.84 percentage points (a 
significant +4.04), to an insignificant -2.56 percentage points (insignificant –0.21).  
Similarly, for the four-month event window of t-2 to t +1, the cross-border effect is reduced 
from a highly significant +10.07 percentage points, to an insignificant +3.26.  The target 
company cross-border effect thus appears to be attributable largely to differences in the 
characteristics of domestic and cross-border acquisitions and the impact of such bid and 
company characteristics on the level of target company abnormal returns.  Once we control 
for the impact of bid characteristics – in particular the method of payment offered – there is 
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no evidence of a significant residual target company cross-border effect in the UK, 
regardless of whether the analysis is based on the bid month, or whether longer event 
windows surrounding the bid announcement are applied. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the abnormal returns to target company shareholders in 116 
cross-border and 514 domestic takeover bids for UK listed companies during the 1986-
1991 period.  During the t-8 to t-3 (where t refers to the month of the bid announcement) 
period, target shareholders in both domestic and cross-border acquisitions suffer negative 
abnormal returns, indicating that target companies tend to under-perform prior to the bid 
announcement.   
During the month of the bid announcement, large and highly significant abnormal 
returns accrue to shareholders in both domestic and cross-border targets, amounting to a 
highly significant 18.76% (20.29%) with the size deciles model (the market model) for 
targets in domestic acquisitions, and 19.60% (21.05%) for UK targets acquired by foreign 
firms.  The target company cross-border effect during the month of the bid announcement 
is small, at 0.84 (0.76) percentage points, and not statistically significant.  However, over 
the four month period from t-2 to t+1, UK target shareholders gained a highly significant 
10.07 (6.98) percentage points more in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions, with 
cumulative abnormal returns of 30.71% (31.35%) in cross-border compared to 20.64% 
(24.37%) in domestic acquisitions. 
The level of abnormal returns to target shareholders in cross-border acquisitions is 
found to be somewhat higher in bids by companies based outside Europe or the US, 
although the coefficients are only significant for the two-month event window.  None of the 
other dummy variables for bidder location are significant. We therefore find only limited 
support for an international diversification effect premium.  The target premium in cross-
border acquisitions appears not to be significantly influenced by whether or not the bidder 
had prior UK operations.  There is thus no evidence to support a UK market access 
premium.  Rather surprisingly, we find a negative EU market access premium, with UK 
targets gaining more in acquisitions by bidders who already had prior EU operation.  This 
is inconsistent with the market access hypothesis, which we therefore reject.  Finally, we 
find no support for the exchange rate hypothesis, whereby target returns would depend on 
the strength of the currency of the overseas acquiring company.  
The target company cross-border effect, however, appears to be attributable largely 
to differences in the characteristics of domestic and cross-border acquisitions, and the 
impact of company and bid characteristics on the level of target abnormal returns.  Indeed, 
the level of abnormal returns is found to depend significantly on the bid characteristics, in 
particular the method of payment.  Target shareholders gain significantly less in equity 
offers, and somewhat more in cash offers with loan note alternatives.  As a significantly 
higher (lower) proportion of domestic than cross-border acquisitions are equity (cash) 
offers, this appears to account for most of the target company cross-border effect. 
Other bid characteristics, including bid outcome and whether or not the bid was 
competitive, are also found to have a significant impact on the cross-sectional variation in 
the level of abnormal returns.  Once bid characteristics are controlled for, the bid month 
cross-border effect with the size deciles model reverses sign to -2.56 percentage points, 
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while for the longer event period from t-2 to t+1 months, the cross-border effect is reduced 
to an insignificant +3.26 percentage points.  The cross-border effect thus appears to be 
attributable largely to differences in the bid characteristics of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions.  There is no evidence of a residual target company cross-border effect being 
present in the UK once the method of payment and other bid characteristics are controlled 
for. 
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Table 1 
Target Company Abnormal Returns 
 Domestic 
Acquisitions 
Cross-Border 
Acquisitions 
Cross-Border 
Effect 
Model SD   MM SD    MM SD MM 
Sample 514    389 116      96 630 485 
Month:       
-8 -0.0167*** -0.0181*** -0.0133 -0.0177*  0.0034  0.0004 
-7 -0.0137*** -0.0089 -0.0120 -0.0068  0.0017  0.0021 
-6 -0.0130*** -0.0099*  0.0007 -0.0002  0.0137  0.0097 
-5 -0.0100* -0.0035 -0.0131 -0.0081 -0.0031 -0.0046 
-4 -0.0143*** -0.0064 -0.0165 -0.0156 -0.0022 -0.0092 
-3 -0.0227*** -0.0184*** -0.0216** -0.0172*  0.0011  0.0012 
-2 -0.0030  0.0049  0.0289**  0.0210  0.0319**  0.0161 
-1  0.0262***  0.0378***  0.0544***  0.0690***  0.0282*  0.0312* 
 0  0.1876***  0.2029***  0.1960***  0.2105***  0.0084  0.0076 
+1 -0.0043 -0.0019  0.0277**  0.0130  0.0320***  0.0149 
+2 -0.0052* -0.0034  0.0092  0.0053  0.0144**  0.0087 
+3 -0.0035 -0.0033 -0.0092** -0.0121*** -0.0058 -0.0088 
+4 -0.0060 -0.0063* -0.0087 -0.0121** -0.0027 -0.0058 
+5  0.0004  0.0021 -0.0003  0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0007 
       
Cumulative Abnormal Returns:     
-8,-3 -0.0904*** -0.0651*** -0.0757*** -0.0656**  0.0147 -0.0005 
-2,-1  0.0232***  0.0428***   0.0833***  0.0900***   0.0601**  0.0472** 
 0,+1  0.1833***  0.2010***  0.2238***  0.2235***  0.0405*  0.0225 
-2,+1  0.2064***  0.2437***  0.3071***  0.3135***  0.1007***  0.0698*** 
+1,+5 -0.0185*** -0.0127  0.0187 -0.0045  0.0372**  0.0082 
-8,+5  0.1018***  0.1678***  0.2223***  0.2305***  0.1205***  0.0627 
Average abnormal returns to shareholders of UK companies which received domestic and cross-border 
takeover bids, respectively.  The cross-border effect refers to the difference in the levels of mean abnormal 
returns to target companies in cross-border and domestic acquisitions.  The abnormal returns are calculated 
using 5 different test models, although for brevity the results are only reported for the size deciles (SD) and 
the market model (MM).  The results for the other three models are available from the author upon request.  
The models are as specified in equations 1 and 2 in the text.  Time periods refer to months relative to the 
month of the bid announcement, which is denoted 0.  Not all target companies remained listed during the 
months following the takeover bids.  (For the size deciles model, the sample size for domestic (cross-border) 
transactions falls to 501 (102) for month t+1, while by time period t+5, only 98 (24) targets remain listed).  
Restricting the analysis to companies which remained listed after the bid will bias the sample towards 
predominately failed bids.  Instead, for targets that were delisted, the return on the share has been assumed to 
be equal to the benchmark (i.e., abnormal return of zero) during the months where data is missing.  (The 
negative post-bid returns are somewhat larger in magnitude if the sample is restricted to companies that 
remained listed over the whole event period.  Indeed, for these – predominately failed – transactions, the 
cumulative abnormal returns (with the size deciles model) over the period t-8 to t+5 are small, at 6.60% 
(9.63%) in domestic (cross-border acquisitions), and are not statistically significant.  The impact of bid 
outcome on the level of abnormal returns is discussed further in the cross-sectional analysis below).  The 
level of statistical significance of the equally weighted abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns, are tested 
using the cross-sectional t-test (Strong (1992)).  The differences in abnormal returns in cross-border and 
domestic acquisitions is tested using a two-sample difference in means t-test (Weiss and Hassett (1986)).  
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level of significance (using two-tailed 
tests), respectively.   
  
 
 
Table 2 
Sample Characteristics 
  Total 
Sample
Cross-
Border
Domestic
Sample  630 116 514 
  
Region EU 31.9% 
 Non-EU European 20.7% 
 US 19.0% 
 Rest of the World 28.5% 
  
UK Entry Prior UK operations 40.5%
 No prior UK operations 18.1%
 Unclassified (insufficient information) 41.3%
  
EU Entry Prior EU operations 55.2%
 No prior EU operations 9.5%
 Unclassified (insufficient information) 35.3%
  
Exrate Mean exchange rate value 0.0083  
   
Payment Cash only 18.6% 45.7% 12.5%a) *** 
 Cash w/full ln alt 16.4% 42.2% 10.5%
 Equity only 16.0%  0.9% 19.5%
 Equity w/full cash alt 21.8% 0.9% 26.5%
 Other bids 27.3% 10.3% 31.1%
  
Hostile Hostile bid 24.0% 22.4%  24.4% a)
  
Competitive Multiple bidders 6.7% 6.0% 6.8%a)
  
Revised Offer revised 12.5% 12.1% 12.7%a)
  
Outcome Failed bid 17.8% 15.5% 18.3%a)
  
Industry Industrials & Resources 36.6% 34.8% 36.9%a) ** 
 Consumer goods 18.4% 20.5% 17.9%
 Services 29.2% 20.5% 31.0%
 IT & Financials 15.9% 24.1% 14.2%
  
Related Horizontal 50.5% 65.8% 46.9%a) ** 
 Vertical 17.9% 13.2% 19.1%
 Conglomerate 31.6% 21.1% 34.0%
  
Stake% Mean stake 8.4% 15.6% 6.7%b) ***
  
Ln MV Mean pre-bid market value (log) 3.277 3.619 3.200b) ** 
  
 
EU refers to cross-border bids by companies based in countries which were members of the European Community 
at the time of the acquisition, Non-EU European to bids by companies based in other European countries, US to 
bids by US companies, and Rest of the World to acquisitions by companies based outside of Europe and the US.  
UK entry refers to whether or not the overseas acquiror had UK operations prior to the bid announcement, while 
EU entry refers to whether the cross-border bidder had operations within the EU (including the UK) prior to the 
acquisition.  Despite the use of numerous data sources, it has not been possible to verify whether the overseas 
bidder had UK (EU) operations prior to the bid for all transactions.  These unclassified bids are treated as residual 
categories.  The method of payment is classified depending on the method of payment offered in the final bid.  
Loan alt refers to where the offer contained a full loan note alternative.  Hostile is a dummy variable taking the 
value 0 if the initial offer was not rejected by the Board of Directors of the target company and 1 if the bidder’s 
offer was hostile, Competitive is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if only one company bid for the target and 1 
if two of more bidders competed for the target, Revised is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if the offer was not 
revised and 1 if the terms of the offer were revised (terms of the offer improved by increasing the offer price and/or 
adding more choice with regard to the method of payment), Outcome is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if the 
bid was successful (in that the bidding company obtained control of the target company) and 1 if the offer failed, 
Industry refers to the industry classification of the target company, and is split into four broad categories based on 
London Stock Exchange industry groupings, Related refers to whether the target and bidding companies operated 
within the same industries, and is subdivided into three mutually exclusive categories: horizontal (where the two 
companies operated within the same industry and were competitors prior to the acquisition); vertical (where the two 
companies operated at different levels within the same industry (e.g., the acquisition of a supplier or customer); and 
conglomerate (where the target and bidding companies operated within separate industries).  Stake % refers to the 
percentage holding by the bidding company in the target company at the time of the bid announcement,  Ln MV is 
the log of the pre-bid market capitalization of equity of the target company, and Exchange rate refers to the 
deviation from the average exchange rate over the two year period prior to the month of the bid announcement 
(values below zero indicating foreign exchange rate being strong (compared to previous exchange rates) relative to 
Sterling).  *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level of significance (using two-
tailed tests), respectively.  Tested using a) Chi-squared and b) difference of mean t-test. 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Cross-Border Target Abnormal Returns 
Event window Month 0   Months 0, +1 Months –2, +1 
Constant  0.1354    0.1390   0.3567** 
Non-EU Europe -0.0363   -0.0493  -0.1168 
US  0.0514    0.0327  -0.0384 
Rest of World  0.0978    0.1377**   0.0325 
Prior UK ops. -0.1137   -0.0536  -0.0147 
No prior UK ops. -0.0482   -0.0148  -0.0582 
Prior EU ops.  0.1900*    0.1368   0.0599 
No prior EU ops.  0.1292    0.0646   0.1224 
Exchange rate  0.2139    0.1826   0.1961 
Cash only  0.0200    0.0546   0.0581 
Cash w/ln alt  0.0567    0.0786   0.1472* 
Hostile  0.0651    0.0525   0.0409 
Competitive  0.0899    0.1750   0.0643 
Revised -0.0648   -0.0465  -0.0951 
Outcome -0.0384   -0.0482  -0.0358 
Consumer goods -0.0563   -0.0202  -0.0415 
Services  0.0390    0.0001  -0.1096 
IT & Financials -0.0531   -0.0386  -0.1146* 
Vertical  0.1254*    0.1177*   0.0710 
Conglomerate -0.0359    0.0036  -0.0120 
Stake%  0.0007    0.0002  -0.0008 
Log MV -0.0233   -0.0242  -0.0254 
Observationsa   110     110    110 
Adjusted R2   2.7%     0.3%    6.1% 
F-value   1.14     1.02    1.34 
P-value   0.322     0.454    0.176 
Table contains regression output from cross-sectional analysis of abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns to 
target company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions into the UK.  The analysis is undertaken using OLS 
regressions, controlling for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)).  Analysis has also been undertaken using robust 
rank regressions.  Coefficients reported in italics indicate that the OLS and rank regressions provide conflicting 
results as to the sign or whether or not the coefficient is statistically significant.  Variables as defined in Table 2.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level of significance (using two-tailed tests), 
respectively.  a) Some of the cross-sectional variables were not available for all companies, thus reducing sample 
sizes.  (Restricting the analysis to targets which remained listed during month t+1 reduce the sample size to 96.  
For the t to t+1 event window, the changes in the size of the non-significant coefficients are generally trivial, and 
there is no change in the sign of the significant coefficients.  However, the constant and coefficients on ‘non-EU 
European’ and ‘log MV’ gain significance, while the coefficient on ‘rest of the world’ is no longer significant.  
The adjusted R2 increase to 7.8%, although the regression overall remain not significant.  For the t-2 to t+1 event 
window, the coefficients for the four dummy variables for UK and EU operations all switch sign under OLS 
regression (but remain insignificant), while the coefficients retain the reported signs under robust rank regressions. 
 This suggests that large observations have a bigger impact on the OLS regressions for the restricted than for the 
full sample, due to the smaller sample size.  While the signs remain robust, the coefficients for ‘cash w/ln alt’ and 
‘IT & financials’ lose significance for the restricted sample, and the adjusted R2 drops to 0.0%). 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Domestic Targets and Total Sample Abnormal 
Returns 
Event window Month 0 Months 0, +1 Months –2, +1 
Constant   0.2144***   0.2021***   0.2589*** 
Cross-Border  -0.0256  -0.0021   0.0326 
Cash only  -0.0025   0.0012  -0.0205 
Cash w/ln alt   0.0280   0.0442   0.1116*** 
Equity only  -0.0875***  -0.0830***  -0.1250*** 
Equity w/cash alt  -0.0249  -0.0351  -0.0382 
Hostile   0.0165   0.0397   0.0254 
Competitive   0.0212   0.0881**   0.0785* 
Revised   0.0269   0.0282   0.0442 
Outcome  -0.0294  -0.0755***  -0.0748** 
Consumer goods   0.0133   0.0333   0.0241 
Services  -0.0260  -0.0188  -0.0284 
IT & Financials  -0.0392  -0.0248  -0.0496 
Vertical   0.0029  -0.0114  -0.0043 
Conglomerate  -0.0128  -0.0085  -0.0080 
Stake%  -0.0005  -0.0006  -0.0005 
Log MV   0.0023   0.0023  -0.0038 
Observationsa      595      595      595 
Adjusted R2      2.2%      3.8%      8.2% 
F-value      1.85**      2.48***      4.32*** 
Table contains regression output from cross-sectional analysis of abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns to 
target company shareholders in domestic and cross-border acquisitions into the UK.  The analysis is undertaken 
using OLS regressions, controlling for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)).  Analysis has also been undertaken using 
robust rank regressions.  All coefficients have the same sign and level of significance under OLS and robust rank 
regressions.  Variables as defined in Table 2.  Cross-Border is a dummy variable taking the value 1 in cross-border 
acquisitions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level of significance (using two-
tailed tests), respectively.  a) Some of the cross-sectional variables were not available for all companies, thus 
reducing sample sizes.  (Restricting the analysis to targets which remained listed during month t+1 reduce the 
sample to 569 observations.  For the t to t+1 event window, the coefficient for the ‘cross-border effect’ switch sign 
from an insignificant –0.21% to a still insignificant +1.12%.  None of the other coefficients alter noticeably, and 
there are no changes to the significance levels of the coefficients.  The overall explanatory power of the model 
improves marginally, with an adjusted R2 of 4.9%.  For the t-2 to t+1 window, all coefficients maintain their sign 
and significance levels, except for ‘conglomerates’, which switch sign from –0.80% to +0.32%, although neither 
coefficient is significant.  The adjusted R2 falls marginally, to 7.5%). 
 
 
 
Notes 
                                            
1 If markets for corporate control are segmented across national boundaries, domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions may produce different levels of abnormal returns (Fatemi and Furtado, 1988).  The rules 
and regulations governing mergers and acquisitions, or the efficiency of the market for corporate 
control, may also have an impact on the level of abnormal returns (Conn and Connell, 1990).  
However, although these factors may result in different levels of abnormal returns to target 
shareholders in different countries, and to different levels of acquiror returns in domestic and cross-
border acquisitions, the segmented or inefficient takeover markets hypotheses are unlikely to account 
for differential target wealth effects in domestic and cross-border acquisitions within a country. 
A further consideration relates to the scope for cost savings post acquisition.  Jacquemin et 
al. (1989) find cross-border acquisitions within the EU to reveal little evidence to suggest that these 
transactions result in greater efficiencies or that economies of scale or monopoly powers are 
exploited.  Indeed, economies of scale may be easier to achieve in domestic than in cross-border 
acquisitions.  If acquiring companies share cost savings with target shareholders, this would suggest 
that target shareholders may gain more in domestic than in cross-border acquisitions.  The effect of 
differential cost savings following domestic and cross-border acquisitions is not analysed in this 
study. 
There is also a possibility that bidding companies based in some countries will be subject to 
more favorable tax treatment or accounting regulation than companies from other countries.  This 
may affect their ability or willingness to pay high takeover premia (Choi and Lee, 1991).  Eighteen 
overseas countries are represented in the cross-border acquisitions into the UK covered in this study. 
 An analysis of the different accounting regulations or tax treatments in these countries is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
Hymer (1976) argues that foreign investors may be at a cost disadvantage relative to 
domestic ones, with e.g., cultural differences and geographical distance adding to the cost and 
complexity of the transaction (Dewenter (1995)).  Regulatory and economic barriers may also reduce 
the probability of success of a cross-border bid.  Consequently, the merger premium the bidder is 
willing to pay may be lower in cross-border than in domestic transactions.  (I am grateful to the 
referee for bringing these arguments to my attention).  While such costs may deter overseas 
companies from attempting to acquire UK companies (reducing the number of cross-border bids we 
observe), they are unlikely to result in a negative target company cross-border effect.  If takeover 
markets are competitive, foreign companies deciding to acquire UK firms are likely to have to pay at 
least as high premia as domestic bidders for their targets, despite the higher costs associated with 
cross-border acquisitions.  We may therefore expect to find no difference in the abnormal returns in 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions, although we are unlikely to observe a negative target 
company cross-border effect.  However, to allow for the theoretical possibility of a negative effect, 
we apply two-tailed tests of statistical significance in the analysis of target company cross-border 
effects. 
2 These sample sizes refer to those for the size deciles model.  Due to their generally more stringent 
data requirements, the sample sizes for the other test models are generally somewhat lower.  During 
the six year period of analysis, 756 domestic and 208 cross-border takeover bids were announced.  
However, as the analysis is based on ordinary shares, 3 domestic bids for preference shares are 
excluded from the analysis.  In addition, partial takeover bids (5 cross-border and 8 domestic) are 
excluded, as these bids require special dispensation from the Takeover Code (The Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers (1990)); as is common in event studies (e.g., Dimson and Fraletti (1986), 
bids for investment trusts (9 cross-border and 43 domestic) are excluded due to different valuation 
issues relating to such companies; bids for water companies (13 cross-border and 6 domestic) are 
excluded as such bids are strictly regulated through the Water Act 1989 (DTI (1991); bids where 
two or more companies jointly bid for the target (2 cross-border and 9 domestic) are excluded, as 
are (1 cross-border and 3 domestic) follow-on bids by the same bidder for the same target within a 
twelve month period.  In order to avoid double-counting, target companies are only included once in 
competitive bidding contests, with the bid date and characteristics being based on the first 
bid/bidder.  Bids by second and subsequent bidders have been excluded (21 cross-border and 41 
domestic).  Finally, bids where the Acquisitions Monthly listing (4 cross-border and 15 domestic) is 
incomplete is excluded from the analysis.  Following this screening process, 153 cross-border and 
628 domestic bids remain.  Lack of return data further reduces the sample to 122 cross-border and 
527 domestic takeover bids.  The abnormal returns (CAR from t-2 to t+1) are more than 3 standard 
deviations away from the mean for 4 cross-border and 10 domestic bids.  These outliers are 
removed.  Market capitalization data are missing for 2 cross-border and 3 domestic targets, resulting 
in a final sample of 116 cross-border and 514 domestic acquisitions for the size deciles model. 
 
                                                                                                                                
3  Market values are obtained from the quarterly issue published 6 to 9 month prior to the bid 
announcement, in order to ensure that the values are not influenced by rumours regarding the 
forthcoming bid announcement. 
4 The nationalities of the bidding companies in the 116 cross-border acquisitions are: Australia (11), 
Belgium (1), Canada (4), Eire (3), Finland (3), France (15), Germany (8), Hong Kong (1), Japan (6), 
Liechtenstein (3), Luxembourg (1), Netherlands (6), New Zealand (8), South Africa (1), Saudi 
Arabia (1), Sweden (13), Switzerland (9), and US (22). 
5 The other test models are specified as follows: 
IM:  Rit = Rmt + µit (3) 
CAPM: Rit = Rft + βi(Rmt - Rft) + µi (4) 
HGSC:  Rit = Rft + β1i(Rmt - Rft) + β2i(RHGt - Rmt) + µit (5) 
where Rf refers to the risk-free interest rate, Rm the return on the Financial Times Actuaries index for 
the UK market, αi and βi are regression coefficients, and RHG the return on the Hoare Govett small 
companies index.  The HGSC model is discussed further in Gregory (1997).  Results based on these 
test models are available from the author upon request. 
  
6  The level of statistical significance is also tested using the Wilcoxon signed-rank nonparametric test 
of the median.  The level of statistical significance using this test (not reported) is overall very 
similar to those using the t-test, and provide consistent conclusions to those drawn based on the 
parametric statistics.  All significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
 
7  A correlation matrix for all variables was produced for the total sample, as well as for the samples of 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions separately.  For brevity, we do not report the full correlation 
matrix, but it is available upon request.  As explained further in the analysis, a few independent 
variables are significantly correlated.  In these circumstances, various tests have been undertaken to 
test the robustness of the results.  
 
8 Factors affecting the decision as to what form of payment to offer include not only tax 
considerations and information effects.  As discussed in Martin (1996), other aspects affecting the 
payment decision include managerial ownership and control issues, pre-bid share performance, cash 
balances, the importance of institutional shareholders and block holders, and the presence of growth 
opportunities. 
9 Another variable, which has in the literature been found to be of some importance, is the relative 
size of the target and bidding companies.  For the UK, Sudarsanam et al. (1996) find target 
company shareholders to gain more when their company is small relative to the size of the bidder.  
However, in this study, data on the market value of the bidding company is missing for 256 
acquisitions. The variable was included in additional regressions (not reported), but was not found 
to be significant for any of the event windows with any of the samples. 
10  For prior UK (EU) operations, data was missing for 41.4% (35.3%) of the transactions.  This is 
similar to Fatemi and Furtado (1988), who in their analysis of cross-border acquisitions into the US 
found 79.5% to have prior US operations, 1.7% not to have prior operations, and 18.8% not known.  
The results are similar and the conclusions robust to whether ‘no information’ is treated as a third 
category or (as do Fatemi and Furtado) combined with the ‘no prior UK (EU) operations’ categories.  
 
11  There is a potential problem of colinearity between the ‘prior UK operations’ and ‘prior EU 
operations’ variables, due to a correlation coefficient of 0.744 between the variables.  In regressions 
excluding controls for prior EU operations, all of the coefficients for ‘no prior UK operations’ 
remain insignificant, as do the coefficients for ‘prior UK operations’.  The finding of no support for 
the UK market access hypothesis is thus robust.  Similarly, excluding controls for prior UK 
operations, all of the coefficients for ‘no prior EU operations’ remain insignificant, while the 
coefficients for ‘prior EU operations’ are significantly positive for the short and medium windows.  
We therefore continue to reject the EU market access hypothesis. 
 
12  There are only one each of ‘equity only’ and ‘equity with full cash alternative’ bids present in the 
cross-border sample.  Due to the small samples, these observations are included in the residual 
payment category captured by the intercept.  However, additional analysis (not reported) with these 
two variables included in the analysis, indicate that the abnormal return in the one ‘equity with full 
cash alternative’ bid is significantly lower than for other cross-border bids (for the two short event 
windows), although the coefficient for ‘equity only’ is not significant. 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
13  The correlation coefficients are in particular high between ‘hostile’ and ‘revision’ (0.450), ‘hostile’ 
and ‘outcome’ (0.507), and ‘competitive’ and ‘outcome’ (0.442), while the correlation coefficients 
for the other three pairs of variables are all below 0.210. 
 
 
